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Within the philosophy of science, the realism debate has been revitalised by the development of forms of structural realism. These urge a shift in focus from the object oriented ontologies that come and go through the history of science to the structures that remain through theory change. Such views have typically been elaborated in the context of theories of physics and are motivated by, first of all, the presence within such theories of mathematical equations that allow straightforward representation of the relevant structures; and secondly, the implications of such theories for the individuality and identity of putative objects. My aim in this talk is to explore the possibility of extending such views to biological theories. An obvious concern is that within the context of the latter it is typically insisted that we cannot find the kinds of highly mathematised structures that structural realism can point to in physics. I shall indicate how the model-theoretic approach to theories might help allay such concerns. Furthermore, issues of identity and individuality also arise within biology. Thus Dupre has recently noted that there exists a ‘General Problem of Biological Individuality’ which relates to the issue of how one divides ‘massively integrated and interconnected’ systems into discrete components. In response Dupre advocates a form of ‘Promiscuous Realism’ that holds, for example, that there is no unique way of dividing the phylogenetic tree into kinds. Instead I shall urge serious consideration of those aspects of the work of Dupre and others that lean towards a structuralist interpretation. By doing so I hope to suggest possible ways in which a structuralist stance might be extended to biology.


Introduction: the Structuralist Tendency
Within the philosophy of science in general a certain ‘structuralist tendency’ has become prominent, offering a framework that can accommodate a range of issues, including scientific representation, inter-theory relations, theory-model and theory-data relations, as well as various forms of scientific realism and anti-realism (van Fraassen, 2006; forthcoming). In its most general form it offers a way of representing theoretical structures, models, data structures and so forth by presenting the relevant structures (of course) and, significantly, capturing the relevant relations (‘horizontal’, between theories and models, and ‘vertical’, between the latter and data models etc.). Currently the most widely accepted (meta-level) representational framework is set-theoretical, as exemplified by the semantic or model-theoretic approach, which comes in various flavours. Alternative frameworks have also been proposed, such as the category-theoretic (Landry 2007) and more recently an approach advocating ‘minimal shared structure’ has been suggested (Brading and Landry 2007; for a critical response see French forthcoming). 
		With regard to the realism-antirealism debate, in particular, the structuralist tendency has generated vigorous discussions. Motivated by concerns regarding theory change and the ontological implications of modern physics, in particular, two forms of ‘structural realism’ have been proposed: ‘Epistemic Structural Realism’ (ESR) claims that all that we know, is structure (Worrall, 1989), whereas the so-called ‘Ontic’ form (OSR) insists that all that there is, is structure (Ladyman, 1998; French and Ladyman, 2003). The latter in particular has been articulated in terms of the semantic approach, on the grounds that this nicely reveals the relevant structural commitments. 
		Ontic structural realism can be further divided into eliminativist and non-eliminativist forms, with the former insisting that there are no objects, strictly speaking (in the sense that putative objects are reconceptualised in structuralist terms), and the latter adopting a ‘thin’ ontology of objects, whereby their identity is determined contextually, via the relations they enter into (for further details, see French and Ladyman forthcoming). Finally, stepping outside the realist view in general, structural empiricists claim that all that we know through science is structure, arguing that this yields a view ‘… not of what nature is like but of what science is’ (van Fraassen, 2008, p. 139).
Both critics and defenders of these positions have referred to certain historical precedents in order to grant legitimacy to their views, with the work of Poincaré and Russell invoked in particular. However, neither of these authors’ forms of structuralism, although interesting in themselves, were informed by the implications of quantum physics for the notion of physical object. Two approaches that explicitly did are those of Cassirer and Eddington (Cei and French, forthcoming; French, 2003). Although neither could be described as a realist in the modern sense, both incorporated the implications of quantum mechanics into their positions in illuminating and fruitful ways. In particular, like the quantum physicists Born and Heisenberg themselves, they took these implications to undermine the identity and individuality of quantum objects. Objectivity, however, was secured through the resources of group theory, introduced into quantum physics most notably by Weyl and Wigner (French, 1999; 2000). This allowed Eddington, for example, to go beyond Russell by characterising structure in terms of a pattern of ‘inter-relatedness of relations’, using the algebra of operators representing spin as his exemplar. 
	Cassirer famously defended his neo-Kantian philosophy against the implications of modern physics and likewise favoured a group-theoretic approach, even extending it to non-physical sciences such as Gestalt Psychology (see Cei and French forthcoming). Such a move can be situated within his critique of physics-based philosophy of science as espoused by both the positivists and his neo-kantian peers. In urging the functional unity of science, understood itself as a symbolic form, he also adopted a broadly structuralist approach to biology (see Krois, 2004; pp. 1-19). Thus, in (Cassirer 1950), he focused on the mechanism vs. vitalism debate, portraying it as a methodological rather than a metaphysical issue. Both could be justified within limits, he claimed: although he rejected Dreisch and his notion of entelechy, as Carnap famously did, Cassirer also agreed with the vitalists that ‘life’ could not be reduced to mechanistic processes. Biology had to be understood as the study of systems in which the relationships between elements produce a complex whole and structural changes are studied morphologically, rather than causally. Such an understanding undercuts the above debate since it allows physico-chemical explanations but also insists that certain biological phenomena cannot be explained mechanistically; including, for example, the structures of living things as wholes. There is obviously much more to be said here – particularly with regard to holistic philosophies of biology in general – and, as in the case of physics, Cassirer’s structuralist view of biology could offer a useful resource for future developments. Let me now return to the current debate.

Motivations 
Structural realism can be broadly understood as having two motivations: first to overcome the so-called Pessimistic Meta-Induction, which presents the realist with the problem of accommodating the apparent historical fact of often-dramatic ontological change in science (see Psillos 1999); second, to respond to the metaphysical implications of modern science (in particular, quantum physics) with regard to the ontological status of objects. As we briefly noted above, early structuralists took these implications to directly undermine the identity and individuality of physical objects. However, as is now well-known, one can in fact maintain forms of such identity and individuality within the quantum context (see French and Krause 2006). This generates a form of metaphysical underdetermination in which the relevant physics underdetermines the metaphysics of objects: one ‘horn’ takes them to be individuals, with well-defined identity conditions, the other takes them to be non-individuals (see French and Krause op. cit.). The anti-realist takes this as challenge to the realist: if she can’t establish the metaphysical status of the objects at the heart of her ontology, how can she adopt a realist attitude towards them? The structuralist responds by urging a shift away from objects – thus undercutting the underdetermination – and a focus on the relevant structures. Numerous issues then arise, in particular with regard to the representation and metaphysical conceptualisation of these structures(see French and Ladyman op. cit.). 

Issues
How are we to identify these structures that we are supposed to be realist about? The most obvious route is via the equations, laws etc. that the relevant scientific theories incorporate. More generally, we can do so via the models etc. that these theories present and in terms of which they are to be understood, according to the model theoretic approach (da Costa and French 2003). This offers not only more general access but a more inclusive view of what are to be counted as the relevant structural features of theories – as Ladyman put it, on this account, theories wear such features on their sleeves (Ladyman op. cit.; Ladyman and Ross op. cit.). This is a significant point when it comes to identifying such features of biological theories.
	The second issue is, how are we to represent this structure? Answers to this question will obviously mesh with those given above: if theories are themselves represented as logico-lingustic structures, according to the so-called syntactic approach, then the relevant structure might be represented in similar terms. Famously, the Ramsey sentence has been deployed in this role, since the theoretical terms of a theory are replaced by variables bound by existential quantifiers and with these terms removed, one no longer has to be concerned with reference to objects (as in standard realism)​[1]​. Alternatively, if theories are represented in terms of families of models, typically understood in set-theoretic terms, then the structural features themselves will be represented set-theoretically (Ladyman op. cit.; da Costa and French op. cit.). Others have argued that category theory provides a more appropriate representational resource in this context (Landry 2007), although it is unclear how this can better accommodate the first motivation above. 
	A further issue has to do with how we metaphysically characterise structure. This is perhaps the most contentious of the issues currently under debate and further work is clearly needed. The most obvious approach is via an ontology of relations or n-adic properties in general. However, as has been pointed out, relations presuppose relata and it is objects that typically occupy this role. If these are eliminated, it becomes metaphysically difficult to understand how one can even talk of relations anymore. One option is to take relata and relations, or objects and structures, as ontologically ‘given’ as a package, with neither assigned ontological priority over the other (Esfeld and Lam 2008). Although this is a view with considerable historical pedigree, going back to Eddington for example, it is not clear that it is stable. Alternatively, we might re-conceive our understanding of relations entirely, setting them in a broader metaphysical context with n-adic relations taken as primitive (see, for example, Mertz 2006).
	Rather more discussion has been expended on the final issue of how we can distinguish physical structure from mathematical structure, particularly given the manner in which such structure is represented (and, of course, structuralist philosophies of mathematics are well-developed). The obvious answer is in terms of causality, with the physical structure we are to be realists about understood as fundamentally causal. How such causal aspects are to be incorporated within an ontology in which objects are absent, or at best conceived only ‘thinly’, has become a significant source of debate (Chakravartty 2003: Psillos 2006), although possible ways of doing so are canvassed in (French 2006). Again we shall return to this point below.

Extending Structuralism to Biology
Let us now consider how these various features of structuralism might be extended into the biological domain. We shall begin by considering the twin motivations for structural realism.

Motivation 1: we recall that this had to do with responding to the pessimistic metainduction by uncovering the structural ‘commonalities’ between theories. Using examples from physics, such commonalities are typically identified via the relevant equations and/or laws purportedly carried over from one theory to its successor – perhaps the most well-known example being Fresnel’s equations, recoverable from Maxwell’s. Now, it would seem hard to deny that the kind of broad correspondence underlying such claims of commonality also exists in the biological domain; think, for example of the claim that chromosome inheritance theory reproduces Mendel's laws of inheritance (where it is granted that the inherited factors are not quite as Mendel conceived them; this being analogous to changes in our understanding of the underlying nature of light). Nevertheless, of course, in biology we face the obvious problem of a comparative paucity of mathematised equations or laws by means of which we can identify and access the relevant structures. Even in those cases where we can identify relevant law statements, concerns have been expressed. 
So, take the so-called ‘Ancestral Law of Inheritance’, extracted from Galton’s ‘stirp’ theory, where ancestral contributions are given by the formula:  (0.5) + (0.5)2 + (0.5)3 + … According to one well-known commentator, “[t]oday Galton’s Ancestral Law of Inheritance still stands as a mathematical representation of the average distribution of continuously varying characters in a population of freely outbreeding individuals not subject to selection.” (Olby, 1966, pp. 81-82).Stanford, however, insists that, “… contemporary genetics does not recognize the fractional relationships expressed in Galton’s Ancestral Law as describing any fundamental or even particularly significant aspect of the mathematical structure of inheritance”(Stanford,2006, p. 182). The law is expressed in terms of generational contributions but, Stanford argues, there is nothing in contemporary genetics corresponding to this fractional distribution. Of course, one might argue that put so baldly, this is a poor comparison. Even in the example taken from physics, it is not the case that Fresnel’s equations are written on the face of Maxwell’s theory; likewise, the equations of Newtonian mechanics have to be recovered from Special Relativity under certain constraints and one might suggest that a similar operation needs to be effected here. Still, that leaves very few openings through which the structuralist might get a grip on the relevant common elements between theories. Hence appeal might be made to a more general notion of structure in this case. Stanford rejects this as too vague but such a complaint has little force if we adopt some sort of model-oriented perspective and insist that the relevant structures we should be realists about are revealed through appropriate models, state spaces etc. Stanford has a general response to all such moves: they fail to meet the demand for historically reliable and prospectively applicable criteria for realist belief; however, this now seems too demanding as its hard to see what could satisfy the second conjunct in particular. 
	Let us consider, then, how the role and nature of models in biology might be of service to the structural realist.

Models and Structures in Biology
A useful overview of the nature and role of models in biology is given in Odenbaugh (2008). Earlier discussions, particular in the 1980s, can perhaps be characterised as being particularly focussed on the issue of the advantages that the semantic or model-theoretic approach has over the so-called ‘received’ view. More recently, the discussion has broadened to include the role of such models as ‘mediators’ and their apparent ‘hybrid’ nature.  In the following I’m going to focus on those issues that have particular relevance with regard to structuralism in biology and in particular on the question whether, in the apparent absence of the kinds of laws that the structuralist in physics can point to, biological models can play the same role in offering us access to the biological structures of the world.
	Let me begin by emphasising the distinction between the ‘object’ level, where biological models and theories themselves live, as it were, and the meta-level, where we can place the representational devices of the philosopher, including logic, set theory and so forth. Again, a particularly nice summary with regard to the former is given by Odenbaugh (forthcoming), who begins by characterising biological models very generally as ‘idealised representations of empirical systems’, a characterisation that, of course, could equally apply to models in physics. There are two features of this characterisation that I would like to emphasise (again, following Odenbaugh). The first has to do with the role of idealisation. Thus, infinitely large populations might be assumed in models of natural selection (contentiously, I understand, in the case of Fisher’s pioneering work), certain statistical summaries are deployed in order to yield simple and tractable equations at the macro-level that represent situations sof considerable complexity at the micro-level, as in the case of the Lotka-Volterra Equations,  or geometrically simple representations of butterfly wings are utilised in models of wing pattern formation (see Murray 2003). 
In all these cases there appears to be little if anything to distinguish biological idealisations from those we come across in physics and chemistry – not surprisingly perhaps given both the mathematical nature of the models in the examples above, and the role of analogies (with, for example, ideal gas models in physics) in their construction. And as in the case of idealisations in physics, the same kinds of moves will presumably be made in relating these idealisations with, to put it bluntly, ‘reality’. Here the structural realist needs to adopt a slightly more nuanced stance than the ‘standard’ realist: the latter will typically dismiss idealisations as clearly false, and likewise the models in which they are embedded (although there are ways in which such models can be regarded as pragmatically and approximately, true; see da Costa and French op. cit.); the former, however, may argue that certain idealisations and abstractions represent fundamental structural features of the world. So, the idea here is that, contrary to Cartwright  (1983) for example, certain ‘high-level’ laws and features of theories such as Schrödinger’s equation in quantum physics, or, to use an example discussed recently (North forthcoming), the Hamiltonian representation of classical mechanics, may be regarded as true and as representing the ‘ultimate’ structures of the world. Similar claims might then be made from the perspective of a structuralist view of biology.
	The second feature has to do with the nature of the representation involved and here the usual claim is that biological models exhibit much more diversity than their physical counterparts.  It is important to be a little cautious with regard to the statements of biologists themselves. As in the case of physicists, biologists may switch between the terms ‘theory’ and ‘model’ to describe the same element of scientific practice (for want of a better description) and as with statisticians or behavioural scientists, for example, may even take a model to be simply a set of equations or quantitative assumptions (Odenbaugh forthcoming, p. 2). Suppes noticed this tendency many years ago (Suppes 1960), and insisted that the meaning of ‘model’ across the sciences could be appropriately  articulated via the Tarski set-theoretic formulation, while the use of the concept may differ considerably between domains. This is the sort of distinction drawn upon in (da Costa and French op. cit.), in an attempt to give a unitary account of the wide range of scientific models in general. In particular, it has been argued that such an account can cover the diverse sorts of models one finds in biology. 
Thus, as well as mathematical models, to which I shall return shortly, biologists not only use non-quantitative models, similar in kind to those one finds in physics, say, but also physical models, such as the classic tinplate and wire (these days of course, plastic) Crick and Watson model of DNA as well as, and most notably, model organisms, such as fruit flies, flour beetles and so on. Both these latter kinds of models have been put forward as counter-examples to the ‘embracing’ thesis associated with the model-theoretic approach. However, as has been argued elsewhere (see da Costa and French op. cit; French and Ladyman 1999), these kinds of models can be brought within the scope of this approach, subject t o a certain understanding of what we are doing as philosophers of science: namely, representing at the ‘meta-level’ of the philosophy of science, the relevant elements of practice that exist at the ‘object-level’ of science itself. 
Of course, physical models are used extensively in the non-biological sciences, with scale models traditionally included in discussions of model building in science and the likes of Baird, and others, presenting them as exemplars of the embodiment of  ‘non-propositional knowledge (2004). Likewise, Griesemer and others have noted the role of ‘remnant’ models as taxonomic exemplars (1990). Furthermore, and more importantly, all of these kinds of models, including the fruit flies, mice and assorted other model organisms, can be accommodated as follows: we note first of all, that scientific practice, broadly construed, embraces a diverse array of elements and ‘units of interest’, including theories, models, objects of various kinds, data and so forth. From that perspective, scale models, remnant models and model organisms can be put on a par with theories and mathematical models in general. In particular, what they have in common is their own representational function; from that broad perspective, again, the ‘materiality’ of certain of these elements is (ha ha) immaterial​[2]​. And that representational function can be more or less straightforwardly captured in terms of the model-theoretic approach, via set theoretic partial isomorphisms and so on (French and Ladyman, op. cit.; da Costa and French op. cit., pp. 57-58). Indeed, Suppes made the point many years ago:

‘The orbital theory of the atom is formulated as a theory. The question then arises, does a possible realization of this theory in terms of  entities defined in close connection with experiments actually constitute a  model of the theory, or, put  another  way  which  is perhaps simpler, do  models of an orbital theory correspond well to  data obtained from physical experiments with atomic phenomena? It is true that many physicists want to think of a model of the orbital theory of the atom as being more than a certain kind of set-theoretical entity. They envisage it as a very concrete physical thing built on the analogy of the solar system. I think it is important to point out that there is no real incompatibility in these two vicw-points. To define formally a model as a set-theoretical entity which is a certain kind of ordered tuple consisting of a set of objects and relations  and  operations on these objects is not  to  rule out  the  physical  model of the kind which is appealing to physicists, for  the physical model may be simply taken to define the set of objects  in the set-theoretical  model.’ (Suppes 1960, pp. 290-291)

	So, what we have at the object level of scientific practice are a whole range of representational devices and elements, representing, of course, systems and processes in the ‘world’, and at the meta-level of the philosophy of science we have various (meta-level) means of representing those devices. Obviously, the constraints on those representational relationships will be different but with the materiality or otherwise of the devices themselves set to one side, there appears to be no obstacle to the use of set theory to capture their representational function. And of course, the materiality of these elements may feature in discussions of the ontological status of theories and models themselves  (see the upcoming discussion in a special issue of Synthese).
Now, with regard to mathematical models in particular, Odenbaugh notes that biologists typically distinguish between parameters, variables and laws (op. cit. p. 2), with the former representing the unchanging properties of the system, the latter those properties that are changing under the process considered, and with the ‘laws’ relating the two. It is worth noting, as Odenbaugh does, that the apparent lack of the kinds of laws one finds in physics, for example, has led many philosophers of biology to embrace the model-theoretic approach, particularly those versions, such as Giere’s, that downplay the role of laws in general (Giere 1999). On this latter view, in particular, the focus is on a characterisation of the relevant model together with a hypothesis to the effect that the model is similar to the system in relevant respects and degrees. So, to use Odenbaugh’s example, we have an equation that ‘…describes a mathematical structure which may be claimed to be similar to  the  spatial  dynamics  or  persistence  times  of  metapopulations  of  checkerspot  butterflies in Santa Clara, California or the Glanville fritillary butterflies on the Åland  Islands in the Baltic Sea.’ (op. cit., p. 3). 
These mathematical structures may also be represented in terms of something akin to the phase spaces or, more generally, state spaces of physics. Thus the Lotka-Volterra interspecific competition models can be explicated as state-spaces or “phase portraits.” (ibid., p. 10) It is precisely the ubiquity and significance of such spaces in physics that has led some proponents of the semantic approach to adopt them in their characterisation of models (van Fraassen is perhaps the most notable example, although the tradition goes back to Beth). Of course, as Odenbaugh notes, one should be aware that the ‘metalogic’ concept of model used by philosophers of science may be different from that used by the biologists but this differences can be easily accommodated through the ‘object-‘/’meta-‘level distinction I have suggested here. The point is, even without the kinds of ‘laws’ that one finds in physics, these models appear to have the sorts of features that the structuralist can get her teeth into. Of course, the ontology or, more broadly, metaphysical character of the structures (in the ‘world’) represented in this manner may be quite different from that of the ‘physical’ structure, but this is a further issue.
There is another aspect of the role of models in biology that relates to the above concern and may be seen as a further obstacle to a structuralist stance. This has to do with the diversity of biological models and the purported ‘patchwork’ nature of the coverage of the biological domain (Odenbaugh forthcoming, p. 4). Thus Mitchell has written,

‘If science is representing and exploring the structure of the world, it is reasonable to ask why there is such a diversity of representations and explanations in some domains’ (Mitchell, 2003 p. 2))

The idea here is that we typically find various features of a particular system represented in multiple ways by different models. In particular, we may have one model that is highly focussed and quantitative, that allows for precise predictions, and another that is more general and qualitative, capturing broader features, with both together mapping the ‘contours of biological theory’ (ibid.) Thus, for example, with regard to ‘… metapopulation theory, we have the qualitative “classic model” …, ones  that do not assume that the rate of colonization is constant (i.e., a “propagule rain”)  or that extinction is constant but is affected by the number of occupied sites (i.e., “rescue  effect”),  and  ones  which  are  multispecies  systems  combining  colonization  and  competition.’ (ibid.)
Again, this is not something that is peculiar to biology. Hacking long ago suggested that we pay attention to practice in physics, where we work with multiple models of the electron, for example, rather than ‘the’ theory (Hacking 1983). And Cartwright has famously argued for such a ‘dappled’ view with regard to theories and models in physics and other sciences (Cartwright, 1999). More recently Wilson has constructed a very wide-ranging framework encompassing theories, models and linguistic concepts in general in terms of stitched together ‘facades’ (Wilson 2006). In such cases, it is presumably the lack of a unitary framework that is seen to undermine a structuralist stance but one could, presumably, be a ‘disunificationist’ and accept that we cannot arrive at a completely unified structuralist representation of the world but that each of the patches or facades represents some piece of the underlying structure.  Of course, an obvious question is whether this dappling is necessary or not. Cartwright would insist that it is, because for her that is the way the world is, but the steps taken to reach this ontological conclusion are questionable. Wilson claims that it is unavoidable and this seems plausible in the mathematical cases that he deploys, but less so when it comes to the others drawn from botany and elsewhere.  Odenbaugh notes that the combination of the characterisation of biological systems in terms of large numbers of weakly interacting variables and our cognitive resources means we have no choice but to use multiple models (op. cit., p. 4), but again this appears to rely on broadly pragmatic considerations. Even if it is computationally impossible to tackle the relevant equations, forcing us to use idealised models, this does not necessarily mean that the underlying structure of the world is fundamentally dappled, façade-like or otherwise fractured. That's not to say that it may not be multi-faceted, in just the way that structures in physics are (French 2006) and the structuralist’s answer to Mitchell’s question may be a simple ‘that's the way the structure of the world is’!
It has also been argued that models are relevantly independent from theories in some sense and one could, again, conclude that if the latter form the locus of realist interest in biology, then this again may present problems for the structuralist. This sort of argument has been responded to in general terms elsewhere (da Costa and French op.cit.) but let me articulate this response again in the context of the latter conclusion. 
One can distinguish a weak and strong form of the independence argument. So, the weak form states that the relationship between a theory and model is such that it allows for a degree of independence, at least with regard to the cognitive attitude taken towards the model. This is one way to understand the ‘functional autonomy’ of models within the ‘models as mediators’ programme (Morrison 1999), where by mediating between theories and phenomena models are seen to possess a certain degree of autonomy in terms of acting as the focus of scientific developments.  This is a suggestion that presumably no-one who has flagged up the significance of models would disagree with. A stronger form of this thesis would hold that in mediating between theories and the world, models contain some form of ‘surplus structure’ or extra cognitive resources that means that they cannot be straightforwardly deduced or otherwise obtained from the relevant theory. Cartwright et. al.’s ‘bottom up’ approach to model construction can be seen as a version of this strong view (Cartwright, Shomar and Suarez 1996). However, as in the case of ‘horizontal’ disunification above, there appears to be nothing to prevent an advocate of the model-theoretic approach from directly representing such independent models set-theoretically and accepting that they cannot be appropriately related to higher-level theory (da Costa and French op. cit.). Likewise, there do not appear to be any obstacles to adopting a strcutralist stance towards them.
Of course, as Odenbaugh notes, if we do not have the kinds of high-level theories that feature in the examples used in the above discussions, one might wonder what it is that biological models mediate between (2008 p. 22). His suggestion is that as long as we have an appropriate hierarchy to draw on, we can still maintain there is mediation of a kind. I think that is right, but without a sole highest level theory, as it were, the mediation will have to be taken as relative to whatever is above that particular model in the hierarchy and that, of course, may vary depending on the particular context. This may weaken the notion of mediation to the point where one begins to wonder about its usefulness here; perhaps in the biological domain all one can say is that there are inter-related hierarchies of models and that any particular model ‘mediates’ between those above and below it in the hierarchy. Certainly, with such a weakened notion it’s hard to see how a robust understanding of ‘autonomy’ could be maintained.
However, the example he considers in some detail concerns the stronger version of this approach, whereby further features are introduced that are not obtained from theory. This is the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model again, and he notes that in order to develop models applicable to the relevant situation we have to incorporate empirical assumptions, such as ‘predator satiation’ (ibid. pp. 23-26). But put like this, the independence claim seems less than startling; indeed, it seems to amount to little more than the point that to get workable models from an idealised and often quite abstract representation such as the Lotka-Volterra equations, we need to add reasonable auxiliary assumptions based on a lower-level understanding (e.g. that predators can't glutton themselves to the point of consuming an infinite amount of prey). This example seems quite different from the central one used by Cartwright et. al., taken from the history of superconductivity, where they argue that the core element of the model – not just an auxiliary assumption – had to be introduced from the bottom up, taking into account the relevant phenomena, in the absence of theory and in a way that could not be accommodate by the model-theoretic approach.  Both latter aspects of this claim are in fact faulty: if one pays closer attention to the relevant history one can see that the introduction of the core element was theory related and furthermore the nature of this relationship can be straightforwardly accommodated within the model-theoretic approach (French and Ladyman 1997). Elsewhere it has been argued that this crucial aspect of (partial) independence of models from theories is no impediment to the model-theoretic approach (da Costa and French op. cit.) and certainly I can see no reason to change that view, even in the biological context (Odenbaugh op. cit., p. 26). More importantly, I can see no reason why this partial independence would present an obstacle to the structuralist programme. As in the case of physics, one would anticipate that the ‘biological structure of the world’ would be multi-faceted or featured, and the inter-relationships between different models in different hierarchies (understood as true, or approximately so of course) would correspond to those holding between these different facets or features.
Finally, there are also ‘hybrid’ models that combine mathematical and physical elements. An interesting example is given by Loettgers in her consideration of gene regulation mechanisms (Loettgers, 2007) The focus here is on synthetic biology, where models are seen as ‘engineered genetic networks’ that can be used to both investigate certain regulatory mechanisms and engineer biological components. In particular, these models offer a way of ‘… getting a more complete understanding of the structure of genetic networks and how the structure relates to specific functions.’ (ibid., p. 135) Within this approach, scientists may use mathematical models, synthetic models and model organisms, and variants of all three. Loettger notes, first of all, that this diversity can be in part explained by the different modelling traditions of different communities (geneticists and theoretical biologists), and secondly, and more importantly for our purposes, that ‘synthetic’ models are claimed to combine features of mathematical models and model organisms. Thus the example of the ‘Repressilator’ is presented, in which a cyclic negative feedback loop containing three genes is introduced into a bacterium: the loop results in temporal oscillations in protein concentrations which can then be made visible via a gene for making a fluorescent protein (ibid. pp. 140-141). Here we have biological components used in a model the performance of which is explored under the constraints of particular biological systems, and the construction of this model was guided by mathematical modelling, using network designs based on feedback loops. Now of course, this is not a truly hybrid model in the sense of somehow combining both biological and mathematical elements – that would involve some form of perverse category mistake! What we have here is a material model, the construction of which involved reflection on certain forms of mathematical modelling. In this sense, it does not appear so different from Crick and Watson’s wire and tinplate model, based as it was on mathematical considerations as well as well-known empirical data. Certainly the use of mathematics here seems unproblematic and although it provides another useful example of the diversity of biological models, as should be apparent from the considerations given above, I see no fundamental difficulty in accommodating such models within either the model-theoretic approach or a structuralist framework.
	Let us now turn to the second motivation for a structuralist stance, having to do with issues of ontology and identity. The obvious but fundamental question here is, do the same sorts of concerns about objecthood arise here as in the physics case? As we shall now see, there are some relevant similarities, but also significant differences.

Identity and objecthood in biology
There are, I would claim, at least three such issues that could be invoked in support of adopting a structuralist stance:

i.	gene identity
ii.	gene pluralism vs. the hierarchical approach
iii.	metagenomics and the general problem of biological individuality

Gene Identity
The central claim here is that the notion of ‘gene’ has undergone such a radical transformation during the history of genetics that there are simply no straightforward identity conditions that it could be said to satisfy throughout the course of that history. This has been pointed to in support of an anti-realist stance towards the term; namely that there is no object in the world to which it refers. In this respect the term might be usefully compared to that of ‘electron’ or ‘atom’, which have undergone similar transformations. In the latter cases, structuralist accounts have been given in order to retain a realist interpretation. Thus, Bain and Norton have put forward a structuralist account of changes in our understanding of ‘electron’ in which the structural commonalities implicit within the relevant equations are exposed and offered as the locus of interest for the structural realist (Bain and Norton 2001). And here we see a connection with the first motivation, as it is precisely upon such transformations in the ontology of the putative entities that the pessimistic meta-induction piggybacks. 
	Fox-Keller has been pre-eminent in raising concerns about the notion of the gene:

“Johannsen’s little word [gene], so innocently conceived in the early days of this century, had had to bear a load that was veritably Herculean. One single entity was taken to be the guarantor of intergenerational stability, the factor responsible for individual traits, and, at the same time, the agent directing the organism’s development. Indeed, one might say that no load seemed too great … as long, that is, as the gene was seen as a quasi-mythical entity. But by the middle part of the century, the gene had come to be recognized as a real physical molecule …[and] … that load has become steadily easier to discern.” (Fox Keller,2000)

Thus, the term is required to fulfill a number of roles and the implication is that it simply cannot do so; or at least not in a way that allows us to pin down a consistent set of identity conditions. Fox-Keller has gone on to note that,

“Fifteen years ago Richard Burian observed ‘There is a fact of the matter about the structure of DNA, but there is no single fact of the matter about what the gene is.’ In the interim, things have only gotten worse ...The complications brought by the new data are vast … taken together, they threaten to throw the very concept of ‘the gene’-either as a unit of structure or as a unit of function-into blatant disarray. … Techniques and data from sequence analysis have lead to the identification not only of split genes but also of repeated genes, overlapping genes, cryptic DNA, antisense transcription, nested genes, and multiple promoters (allowing transcription to be initiated at alternative sites and according to variable criteria). All of these variations immeasurably confound the task of defining the gene as a structural unit. … Similarly, discovery of the extensive editorial process to which the primary transcript is subject, of regulatory mechanisms operating on the level of protein synthesis, and others operating even on the level of protein function confound our efforts to give a clear-cut functional definition of the gene.” (Fox Keller, 2002,pp. 66-67)

The comparison with ‘atom’​[3]​ has been usefully drawn by Kraemer (Kraemer, forthcoming), who explicitly addresses the issue of providing appropriate identity conditions and advocates a functional approach. Thus, a ‘gene’ is understood to be identical to a particular sequence of DNA typically assembled in a particular way in certain typical contexts and typically produces specific protein(s). In other words, we should, ‘Identify a gene as a specific DNA sequence, S, that plays a typical functional role, R, of typically producing protein P in context C in an organism O.’ The relationship between structural realism and functionalism in general deserves further exploration (see, for example, McCabe forthcoming, who suggests a structural realist approach to the mind), but we might take functional identity in the above sense as equivalent to a form of ‘thin’ or relational individuality adopted by certain proponents of ontic structural realism, as noted above. On such an account, the ‘gene’ as a biological entity would be reconceptualised structurally in terms of a (multi-aspected) nexus of biological relationships, and individuated in a ‘thin’ manner, via those relationships, or, to put it another way, perhaps, functionally identified via the role(s) it takes on. Alternatively, one might conclude from Fox-Keller’s analysis that no appropriate identity conditions can be given and that not even a ‘thin’ notion of object can be retained in this case. Of course, as in the case of the elementary particles of physics, this would not prevent biologists and others from using the term in scientific discourse; the point is that when we come to (philosophically) reflect on what the term refers to, the above concerns suggest that it is not to an object per se, but rather a node in an inter-related set of biological structures. These conclusions are supported by reflection on the second issue, where something akin to a form of metaphysical underdetermination arises. 

Gene pluralism vs. the hierarchical approach

The units and levels of selection debate is one of the most prominent and significant in the philosophy of biology and what I’m about to present is only a crude sketch that brings out the relevant point for structuralist purposes. 
Thus, there are multiple issues and questions that have arisen in this debate (see Lloyd, 2005) but the two of most relevance here concern what units are being selected in the process of natural selection, and (relatedly) at what level do adaptations occur? The debate centres around two images of selection: one that involves a hierarchy of entities and their traits' environment, another that focuses on genes with properties that enable copying. These images underpin alternative representations of the relevant processes, between which formal and empirical equivalence can be established. This led to the now famous pluralist declaration of Kitcher et. al.:

“Once the possibility of many, equally adequate, representations of evolutionary processes has been recognized, philosophers and biologists can turn their attention to more serious projects than that of quibbling about the real unit of selection” (Kitcher, Sterelny, and Waters 1990).

The central claim of this view is that the distinction between levels of selection is conventional and, furthermore, that the fundamental error underlying the debate is the positing of entities (“targets of selection”) that do not exist (see for example, Waters, 2006).
Lloyd dismisses this as a ‘weak’ pluralism, where by a strong and acceptable form she means one in which the different representations are jointly relevant to describe the phenomena. However, she argues, the gene based representation is dependent on the hierarchical approach and hence cannot be relevant in the manner required. Thus, she writes, 

“… the genic account does not give us a theory independent of individuating causal interactions at various levels of the biological hierarchy, nor does it solve or dissolve the problem of how to individuate those very interactions.” (Lloyd, 2005)

Now, of course, as Lloyd notes, models that are mathematically (or more generally, formally) equivalent may be semantically different, in the sense of possessing different interpretations. Models may also be independent or derivative and the claim of the pluralists is that genic models have a different interpretation and are independent from hierarchical representations. However, counters Lloyd, genic models are in fact derivative from hierarchical models:

“… “genic” level causes are derivative from and dependent on higher level causes. Their genic level models depend for their empirical, causal, and explanatory adequacy on entire mathematical structures taken from the hierarchical models and refashioned.” (Lloyd, 2005)

The pluralists in turn have responded by insisting that hierarchical models don’t ‘own’ the relevant information and hence it can be drawn on by genic representations. This would be to ignore both the priority of discovery, according to Lloyd and the role of methodology; thus, for example, the investigators of the sickle cell gene used a diploid model and not a genic one and hierarchical selectionists successfully formulated the methods for discovering and documenting the higher-level interactions that were involved in evolutionary dynamics involving kin groups, demes, etc.
	However, it is not clear that the characterisation of this debate in terms of pluralism, whether weak or strong, is entirely appropriate. Rather, what we seem to have here is a form of underdetermination, involving empirically equivalent but interpretationally distinct models. Lloyd has emphasized the role of metaphysical elements in the genic representation:

“Given that the genic model construction and metaphysical conclusions are inextricably bound together in the arguments as the pluralists have formulated them, they are not free to slice off metaphysical questions as they wish.” (Lloyd)

Of course, the comparison with the metaphysical underdetermination we find in quantum physics is not straightforward. It is certainly not the case here that we have two models both positing objects, but one taking them to be individuals, the other non-individuals in some sense. Instead, we have one ‘horn’ that itself points to the positing of entities as problematic. Nevertheless, if we take the distinction between alternatives to be fundamentally metaphysical, we can perhaps see this debate as opening the door to a structural understanding of the unit of selection. Certainly, such a stance would allow us to move away from metaphysical quibbling over the entities underlying selection. There is again more to be done here but let me now turn to further and more general considerations in which concerns about individuality arise. 

The general problem of biological individuality
In their defence of a form of ‘promiscuous’ realism in the biological domain, Dupré and O’Malley identify the following implicit assumptions of biological ontology:

a)	‘life’ is organized in terms of the ‘pivotal unit’ of the individual organism 
b)	such organisms constitute biological entities in a hierarchical manner

(Dupré and O’Malley, 2007)

They trace the rise of ‘metagenomics’, which represents a shift in focus away from individual genomes to ‘large amounts’ of DNA ‘collected from microbial communities in their natural environments’ (ibid. p. 836) and, correspondingly, urge a shift in philosophical attention from individual organismal lineages to the ‘overall evolutionary process in which diverse and diversifying metagenomics underlie the differentiation of interactions within evolving and diverging ecosystems.’ (p. 838) Genetic material, from this perspective, is seen as a ‘community resource’.
It is worth noting, in particular, that on this view, causal powers are understood as derived from the interactions of individual components, where these components are controlled and coordinated by the causal capacities of the metaorganism. Here we might draw a useful comparison with the accommodation of causation within physical structures in general: it is not necessary for such an accommodation to always be in terms of causal loci instantiated in terms of specific entities; rather causality can be seen as arising relationally (in this case, from the relevant interactions) and holistically, in the sense that it is ‘located’ across the relevant structure as a whole. 
	Furthermore, ‘[i]ndividual organisms, from this viewpoint, are an abstraction from a much more fundamental entity’ (Dupré and O’Malley p.842). Objects are no more than ‘… temporarily stable nexuses in the flow of upward and downward causal interaction’ (p. 842). In particular, ‘… a gene is part of the genome that is a target for external (that is, cellular) manipulation of genome behaviour and, at the same time, carries resources through which the genome can influence processes in the cell more broadly.’ (ibid). This characterisation of objects suggests that there is no need for ‘promiscuous realism’ since we can adapt a (dynamical) form of structuralism which will allow us to be realist about the relevant biological structures.

Conclusion
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^1	  Famously this approach to the representation of structure has been taken to be vulnerable to the so-called ‘Newman objection’. This has been dealt with by Melia and Saatsi (2006).
^2	  Using model organisms to represent biological systems does of course have an impact on that representational function and as Morgan has noted, reduces the ‘inferential gap’ (Morgan, 2003, pp. 216-235), but this does not affect the ability of the model-theoretic approach to represent them.
^3	  It is worth recalling that Mendelism assumed an atomistic conception of heredity that presupposed stable genetic identities; in his contribution to the conference, Radick nicely contrasted this with Bateson’s account, which viewed heredity in terms of ‘patterns’.
